The Precautionary Principle
In retrospect, it is hard for many people to understand how the unregulated and wide-scale use of asbestos was permitted for so long. Throughout the 20th century, there were many opportunities to implement protective measures for workers, the public and the environment. And yet, despite warnings, little was done. The results in Europe are all too obvious: a torrent of asbestos-related disease will have claimed 500,000 lives by 2029 in six West European countries.
The book: Late Lessons from Early Warnings: the Precautionary Principle 1896-2000 [ISBN 92-9167-323-4], just published by the European Environment Agency, attempts to find out why warnings were so often ignored. The authors of the chapters examining such subjects as asbestos, radiation, benzene and PCBs detail: when the first credible scientific warnings were given, what attempts at risk reduction were made by those in authority, how these actions (or lack of actions) impacted on specific groups and what policy-makers can learn from these histories. The report is designed to assist members of the European Union and European Environment Agency "to frame and identify sound and effective policies that protect the environment and contribute to sustainable development."
In the eleven pages of Chapter 5: Asbestos: from ‘magic’ to malevolent mineral, David Gee and Morris Greenberg present a snapshot of what went wrong as far as asbestos was concerned. They describe the work of pioneers such as Lucy Deane, Dr Montague Murray, Dr. Auribault, Dr Merewether and C W Price who began the public debate on asbestos as early as 1898. The cost of missed opportunities can be expressed in terms of lives lost and cash spent: "A Dutch illustration of some of the potential savings from earlier risk reduction actions has estimated that a ban in 1965… instead of in 1993, would have saved the country some 34,000 victims and NLG 41 billion in building and compensation costs. This is compared to the 52,600 victims and NLG 67 billion in costs expected over the period 1969-2030, estimated by the Dutch Ministry of Health and Social Security (Heerings, 1999)."
Effective and timely action on the hazards of asbestos were not taken because of:
An unwillingness to act on information from credible but "unofficial" sources and a willingness to believe the opinions of "ignorant experts."
Lack of planning and monitoring strategies for health and the environment.
Poor implementation of asbestos regulations.
The long gap between asbestos exposure and illness. The "latency lacuna" often produced the "common error of assuming that ‘absence of evidence of harm’ means ‘evidence of absence of harm.’ It does not."
The externalisation of costs; asbestos victims bore both the physical and financial burden of asbestos-induced ill health, while the taxpayer picked up the tab for environmental pollution.
I recommend the final chapter of the book: Twelve late lessons to all decision-makers, in particular those in countries which have not yet banned asbestos. The warning to "maintain regulatory independence from economic and political special interests" is particularly apposite with reference to asbestos. The international asbestos industry continues to vigorously defend asbestos markets in the developing world. When the government of Chile decided to ban asbestos, the country was faced with a coordinated onslaught from the asbestos industry spear-headed by the Asbestos Institute in Canada. In fact, the Prime Minister of Canada, Jean Chretien, telephoned the President of Chile to ask that the asbestos prohibition law not be signed. The European Environment Agency should send a copy of this book to every government which has not yet banned asbestos with a note saying: act now!
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April 1, 2002
